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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A) NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter comes to this Court due to Ms. Melanie Hansen's, Plaintiff-Appellant's 
violation ofIRCP 4(b) by failing to timely serve Mr. Gary White, Defendant-Respondent. Due to 
this failure of timely service, the District Court granted Mr. White's motion to dismiss the complaint 
without prejudice. Ms. Hansen failed to show good cause for the failure of timely service. The 
District Court ruled from the bench at a hearing on April 27, 2017. R, p. 4. The District Court 
adopted its oral rulings by reference in the Order for Dismissal without Prejudice filed on May 5, 
2017. R, p. 152. Ms. Hansen seeks now to appeal the District Court's decision, but failed to 
include the transcript of the hearing where evidence was presented and where the District Court 
issued its oral rulings. The Final Judgment was also filed on May 5, 2017. 
B) COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
While getting some dates correct, Ms. Hansen failed to represent the course of proceedings 
properly in Appellant's Brief. Therefore, additional information is provided in the following 
recitation of the course of proceedings in order to provide this Court with a full account of the 
District Court's actions. The Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (Complaint) was filed on May 
10, 2016. R. p. 6. After over six months had expired since the filing of the Complaint, Mr. White 
filed a Special Notice of Appearance on November 21, 2016. R. p. 11. Mr. White also filed a 
Motion to Dismiss supported by a memorandum, the Affidavit of Natalie White and Affidavit of 
Gary E. White. R. pp. 13-24. 
Ms. Hansen responded by filing Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Dismiss and Motion for 
Extention (sic) of Time for Service of Process and Proper Proof of Service on December 12, 2016. 
R. p. 25. This response was supported by a memorandum, the affidavit of Officer David R. Barker, 
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the affidavit of Marc Jorgensen, the affidavit of Kristen H. Walker and the affidavit of Michael R. 
McBride. R. pp. 28-63. 
Mr. White filed the Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Response to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Extend Time on December 30, 2016. R. p. 64. Plaintiff filed a supplementary affidavit 
of Kristen H. Walker on January 3, 2017. R. p. 72. The District Court heard the motions on 
January 5, 2017, and ruled from the bench extending the time to serve Mr. White. 
Ms. Hansen filed a Motion for Extension of Time for Service by Publication on January 8, 
2017. R. p. 75. The District Court granted this motion on January 13, 2017. R. p. 78. Mr. 
White filed his Motion for Reconsideration on January 31, 2017, asking the District Court to 
reconsider its denial of the motion to dismiss. R. p. 82. The hearing on this motion to reconsider 
was set for April 27, 2017. 
Mr. White filed a memorandum in support of the motion to reconsider, the Affidavit of 
DeVonne Barron, Affidavit of Dan Lansing and Second Affidavit of Gary E. White on April 13, 
2017. R. pp. 92-125. Ms. Hansen responded by filing her brief in response to the motion to 
reconsider, an affidavit of Kristen H. Walker and an affidavit of Marc Jorgensen on April 20, 2017. 
R. pp. 126-146. Mr. White issued a subpoena to have Officer David Barker testify at the hearing. 
Mr. White also filed a reply brief on April 25, 2017 and the Third Affidavit of Gary E. White on 
April 26, 2017. R. pp. 147-156. 
The hearing was held on April 27, 2017. At the hearing, Officer David Barker testified in 
person as to his recollections of his interaction with Mr. White. The District Court heard the 
testimony and the oral arguments of counsel. The District Court then proceeded to give a reasoned 
oral decision from the bench granting Mr. White's motion to reconsider. On May 5, 2017, the 
District Court issued its order adopting its reasoning from the oral decision and ordering that Ms. 
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Hansen's case be dismissed without prejudice. R. p. 159. The Final Judgment was issued the 
same day. R. p. 157. 
C) 'STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ms. Hansen's recitation of facts in the Appellant's Brief includes many undisputed facts, but 
also includes disputed facts, irrelevant allegations and unsupported assumptions. Therefore, 
following is a statement of the facts that are relevant to this appeal of the District Court's ruling that 
without good cause Ms. Hansen failed to timely serve Mr. White. 
The Complaint was filed on May 10, 2016. R. p. 6. Ms. Hansen was represented by Mr. 
Michael McBride of Signature Law Group, a law firm located in Idaho Falls. R. p. 6. On May 10, 
2016, Mr. White was residing at 3640 Hickory Ct., Idaho Falls, Idaho. R. pp. 121-123. 
The undisputed evidence shows that from May 10, 2016, to October 19, 2016, no effort was 
made to effect service upon Mr. White. R. pp. 55-56. Therefore, over five months transpired from 
the time of the filing of the Complaint before Ms. Hansen or her attorneys took any steps to serve 
the Complaint upon Mr. White. 
Mr. White went to the United State Post Office on October 17, 2016, to fill out a forwarding 
change of address order. R. pp. 153, 156. The temporary change of address was to begin on 
October 25, 2016, and end on April 28, 2017. Id Mr. White's temporary address was 1402 Sea 
Pines Street, Mesquite, Nevada. Id 
On October 19, 2016, Mr. McBride's legal assistant, Kristen Walker, sent the Complaint to 
Bulldog Legal Services. R. p. 55. Ms. Walker provided Bulldog Legal Services the address of 
613 E. 750 N., Firth, Idaho. R. p. 56. This was the address for Mr. White that was on a police 
report dated May 23, 2014. Id 
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The process server attempted to serve Mr. White at the Firth address on October 25, 2016. 
R. p. 43. Mr. White had not lived at the Firth address for over nine years. R. pp. 17-23. The 
process server admits that he was told that the Firth address was not Mr. White's residence. R. p. 
44. The process server reported to Ms. Walker that Mr. White did not reside at the Firth address. 
R. p. 44. Ms. Walker then searched online for one and a half hours and did not find a definitive 
address for Mr. White. R. pp. 72-73. After the internet search, Ms. Walker claims that Mr. 
McBride told her to publish the summons. Id Neither Ms. Walker nor Mr. McBride sought an 
order for permission to serve by publication. Id 
Mr. White moved to Mesquite, Nevada from his Idaho Falls address on or about October 25, 
2016. R. pp. 1:;3, 156. 
Ms. Walker e-mailed a summons for publication to a local newspaper on October 27, 2016. 
R. p. 73. The summons could not be published until November 1, 2016. Id On October 31, 
2016, Ms. Walker then instructed Bulldog Legal Services to serve the summons on the persons at 
the Firth address. Id The process server'provided a copy of the summons and complaint to Mr. 
White's daughter-in-law at the Firth address on November 2, 2016. R. p. 44. Mr. White's 
daughter-in-law informed the process server that Mr. White did not live at that address. R. p. 23. 
The residence at 613 E. 750 N., Firth, Idaho, is not Defendant Gary E. White's usual place 
of abode or his residence. R. pp. 17-18. Defendant Gary E. White has not dwelt or had his usual 
place of abode at 613 E. 750 N., Firth, Idaho, since he sold the house and property in 2009. Id 
The six month time limit to serve Mr. White expired on November 10, 2016. Mr. McBride 
did not file a motion to extend time prior to the expiration of the six month time limit. Mr. White 
was never served with process during the six month time period following the filing of the 
Complaint. R. p. 18. Mr. White never attempted to evade service in this matter. R. pp. 121-122. 
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A few months after the six month time period expired, three different investigative service 
providers, including Bulldog Legal Services, located Mr. White's residence at 3640 Hickory Ct. 
using common searches. R. pp. 108-118; and p. 142. They were able to find Mr. White's address 
in a matter of days. Id During the six month time period, Mr. White had left a forwarding 
address for his residence in Nevada. R. p. 153, 156. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A) Whether this Court should Affirm the District Court's Order Dismissing Plaintiff-
Appellant's Complaint without Prejudice due to Plaintiff-Appellant's Failure to Timely Serve 
Defendant-Respondent? 
B) Whether this Court should Consider Plaintiff-Appellant's Arguments that are made 
for the First Time on Appeal? 
C) Whether this Court should Give Deference to the District Court's Findings due to 
Plaintiff-Appellant's Failure to Provide This Court the District Court's Reasoned Oral 
Ruling? 
III. ARGUMENT 
The evidence in this case coupled with the relevant case law shows (A) that the decision of 
the District Court dismissing Ms. Hansen's Complaint without prejudice should be affirmed; (B) 
that Ms. Hansen should not be able to raise certain arguments for the first time on appeal; and (C) 
that Ms. Hansen should not be able to challenge the District Court's findings when she failed to 
provide the District Court's reasoned oral decision. 
A) The District Court's Ruling Should be Upheld on Appeal 
1) Standard of Review 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "In an appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss 
for untimely service of process, this court freely review the district court's rulings on questions of 
law. Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 64,294 P.3d 184, 190 (2013) (citing: Herrera v. Estay, 146 
Idaho 674, 678-79, 201 P.3d 647, 651-52 (2009). The Court continued holding: 
When reviewing a district court's determination of whether good cause existed to excuse 
the untimely service of process, this Court applies the summary judgment standard of 
review, unless the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing, in which case all 
reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the district court's judgment. 
Id (citing: Elliott v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280,285,271 P.3d 678,683 (2012); see also Sammis v. 
Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342,346,941 P.2d 314,318 (1997)). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) allows a party to move the court to dismiss a case 
based upon lack of personal jurisdiction. Rule 12(b)(5) provides for a dismissal of an action for 
insufficient service of process. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b )(2) states that, "If a defendant is not served within 6 months 
after the complaint is filed, the court, on motion or on its own after 14 days' notice to the plaintiff, 
must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant." Rule 4(c)(l) directs that service 
requires the service of a copy of the summons and complaint. Service on a competent individual 
over 14 can be done by "(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual 
personally; (B) leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with 
someone at least 18 years old who resides there; or (C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized 
by appointment or by law to receive service of process." IRCP 4( d)(l ). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "When the defendant makes a prima facie showing 
that service of process was not accomplished during the six months prescribed by the rule, the district 
court must determine whether there was good cause for the untimely service. The burden is on the 
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party who failed to effect timely service to demonstrate good cause." Martin v. Hoblit, 13 3 Idaho 3 72, 
375,987 P.2d 284,287 (1999) (citing: Simplot v. WC Owens, MD., P.A., 119 Idaho 243,244, 805 
P.2d449, 450 (1990); Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342,346,941 P.2d 314,318 (1997)). 
2) Legal and Factual Analysis 
The evidence proves that (a) Mr. White was not properly served with process during the 
relevant six month time period, (b) Ms. Hansen failed to show good cause why service was not 
accomplished during the requisite six month time period and ( c) the statutes cited by Ms. Hansen do 
not change the service requirements or the definition of"dwelling" or usual place of"abode" in IRCP 
4( d)(l )(B). 
a) Mr. White Made a Prima Facie Showing That He was not Served with Process 
During the Relevant Six Month Time Period 
It is undisputed that Mr. White made a prima facie showing that service of process was not 
accomplished during the six month period as required by IRCP 4( d)(l ). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4( d)(l) states: 
Service of Individuals. An individual, other than a person under age 14 or an 
incompetent person, may be served doing any of the following: 
(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual 
personally; 
(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with 
someone at least 18 years old who resides there; or 
(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process. · 
The evidence provided shows that Mr. White was not personally served with process. R. pp. 
17-18. Ms. Hansen has provided no evidence that Mr. White was personally served. The evidence 
also shows that the Complaint and Summons were not delivered to Mr. White's dwelling or abode 
during the relevant six month time period. R. pp. 17-18, 22-23, 43-44. The evidence shows that 
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Mr. White had his dwelling or place of abode at 3640 Hickory in Idaho Falls, Idaho during the 
majority of the six month time frame. R. pp. 152-156. At the very end of the relevant six month 
time period, Mr. White moved to Mesquite, Nevada. Id Ms. Hansen did not provide any evidence 
that the summons and complaint were delivered to Mr. White at either of Mr. White's dwellings 
during the relevant six month time period or that they were left with a person 18 years or older at 
those same dwellings. It is undisputed that no service was made upon an agent of Mr. White's or 
that Mr. White even had an agent authorized to receive service. Finally, it is also undisputed that 
Ms. Hansen did not serve Mr. White by publication authorized by a court order during the six month 
time period. 
Ibis evidence establishes that Mr. White was not properly served with process during the 
relevant six month time period as required by IRCP 4. 
b) Dismissal of the Complaint is Mandatory Absent Good Cause 
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that dismissal of the complaint is mandatory if 
service is not accomplished within the six month time limit, "absent a showing of good cause." 
Elliott v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280,288,271 P.3d 678,686 (2012); citing: Sammis v. Magn,etek, Inc., 
130 Idaho 342,347,941 P.2d 314,319 (1997). The Supreme Court has also held that, "By its 
terms, Rule 4(a)(2) imposes the burden of demonstrating good cause on the party who failed to 
effect timely service .... " Id" Taylor v. Chamberlain, 154 Idaho 695, 698, 302 P .3d 35, 38 (2013); 
citing: Sammis v. Magn,etek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 346, 941 P .2d 314, 318 (1997). A court, "must, 
considering the totality of the circumstances, determine whether the plaintiff had a legitimate reason 
for not serving the defendant with a copy of the state complaint during the relevant time period." 
Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 132 Idaho 531, 534, 976 P.2d 457,460 (1999). 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "The party required to effectuate service must show 
good cause for failing to serve the defendant timely. Excusable neglect is a lesser standard than 
good cause." Taylor v. Chamberlain, 154 Idaho 695, 698, 302 P.3d 35, 38 (2013). Therefore, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has found that the good cause standard is higher than the excusable neglect 
standard. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has further defined the focus of the good cause inquiry, holding 
that "[i]t is this six-month period following the filing of the complaint, therefore, that should be the 
focus of the court's good cause inquiry regarding why timely service was not made." Martin v. 
Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372, 375, 987 P.2d 284,287 (1999); citing: Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 
342,346,941 P.2d 314,318 (1997). 
The Idaho Supreme Court also stated that, "Courts look to factors outside of the plaintiff's 
control including sudden illness, natural catastrophe, or evasion of service of process." Elliot v. 
Verska, 152 Idaho 280,290,271 P.3d 678,688 (2012); quoting: Harrison v. Bd of Prof'/ Discipline 
ofldahoStateBd ofMed, 145Idaho 179,183, 177P.3d393,397(2008). TheCourtcontinuedin 
Elliot holding, "In deciding whether there were circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control that 
justified failure to serve the summons and complaint within the six-month period, the court must 
consider whether the plaintiff made diligent efforts to comply with the time restraints imposed by 
Rule 4(a)(2)." Elliot, 152 Idaho at 290, 271 P.3d at 688; citing: Martin, 133 Idaho at 377, 987 P.2d 
at 289. 
(i) The Evidence Establishes that Ms. Hansen was not Diligent in Attempting to 
Serve Mr. White 
Ms. Hansen not only failed to show good cause, but the evidence proves that Ms. Hansen 
was not diligent in attempting to serve Mr. White. As indicated in the case law above, in order to 
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show good cause for failure of timely service, a plaintiff must prove that during the six month 
period for service they made diligent efforts to effectuate timely service coupled with a showing of 
circumstances beyond the control of Plaintiff that prevented timely service. Id 
The evidence shows that Ms. Hansen failed to make diligent efforts to timely serve Mr. 
White in this matter by (a) waiting over five months to attempt service, (b) failing to use reasonable 
efforts to serve Defendant and ( c) failing to timely utilize proper legal remedies. 
In order to show diligence the Idaho Supreme Court has found that the amount of time 
Plaintiff waited to attempt service is a significant factor. In Hincks v. Neilson, 137 Idaho 610, 51 
P .3d 424 (2002), the Idaho Supreme Court, in finding lack of diligence noted, that plaintiff waited 
four and a half months after filing the complaint before beginning to attempt service. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has noted that a delay in beginning to attempt to serve was an important factor in 
determining a lack of diligence. See: Elliot, 152 Idaho at 290,271 P.3d at 688 (The Court found 
failure of diligence where plaintiff delayed attempting service for the majority of the six month time 
period); and Martin, 133 Idaho at 377, 987 P.2d at 289 (The Court found it significant that plaintiff 
waited until 11 days prior to six month deadline to serve in determining due diligence). 
The facts of the present case show that Ms. Hansen, her attorney and his assistants waited 
over five months before beginning to attempt to serve the Defendant. R. pp. 43-44; 55-56. Ms. 
Hansen provides no evidence for why service was not attempted prior to five months having elapsed 
since the filing of the Complaint. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that waiting to begin to 
attempt service for months after the complaint is filed shows a lack of due diligence. Elliot, 152 
Idaho at 290, 271 P.3d at 688; citing: Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 532, 66 P.3d 230, 236 (2003) 
(Waiting five and three-fourths months before attempting to effect service does not show due 
diligence.) Without a showing of due diligence, Ms. Hansen cannot be found to have good cause 
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for failing to timely serve Mr. White. Ms. Hansen failed to diligently attempt to serve Mr. White in 
this matter by waiting for over five months before attempting to effect service of process. 
The evidence shows that Ms. Hansen's efforts at service after waiting for over five months 
to start attempting service were not diligent. Ms. Hansen's attorney assigned the matter to an office 
assistant, Kristen Walker, to effectuate service. R. pp. 55-56. Ms. Walker assigned the matter to 
a process server to serve the summons on Mr. White at the address listed on the police report. Id 
The process server reported that the address was not correct. Id Ms. Walker then spent 1.5 hours 
on the internet attempting to locate Mr. White's current address. Id This was the total effort that 
Ms. Hansen, Mr. McBride or his assistant expended in attempting to find a current address for Mr. 
White. 
Under Rule 4(a)(2), Ms. Hansen had six months to serve Mr. White. In that six months, 
Ms. Hansen and her team spent just a few hours attempting to locate Mr. White's address. R. pp. 
56, 72-73. The hour and half spent in attempting to locate a new address for Mr. White was done 
by Kristen Walker. Id Ms. Hansen did not provide any evidence regarding Ms. Walker's 
experience or ability in being able to locate people by browsing on the internet. Ms. Walker 
explains what websites she visited, but does not detail what searches she used or what depth she 
examined results from these websites. There is also no evidence regarding whether Ms. Walker 
could possibly have exhausted the extent of these websites without paying additional fees or 
spending additional time. This minimal amount of time spent researching Mr. White's location 
combined with a lack of evidence regarding Ms. Walker's expertise, shows the lack of diligence by 
Ms. Hansen to serve Mr. White. Ms. Hansen's efforts are not due diligence under the standards set 
forth by the Idaho Supreme Court. See: Elliot v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280, 290, 271 P.3d 678, 688 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 11 
(2012); Hincks v. Neilson, 137 Idaho 610, 51 P.3d 424 (2002) and Martin v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372, 
375, 987 P.2d 284,287 (1999). 
Had Ms. Hansen or her attorney been diligent in their attempts to locate Mr. White, they 
would have easily and with little expense found his current address. The Idaho Supreme Court in 
the Elliot case found that in determining whether plaintiff was diligent consideration of evidence 
showing the ease with which service could have been accomplished is appropriate. Elliot, 152 
Idaho at 291,271 P.3d at 689. The evidence in the present case shows that Mr. White's current 
addresses could have been found through due diligence. 
Mr. White's counsel sought evidence to determine if finding Mr. White's dwelling was 
difficult. Those efforts revealed that Mr. White's dwelling at 3640 Hickory in Idaho Falls was 
easily discovered in simple searches based only upon information in the police report. R. pp. 108-
118; and p. 142. Mr. White's counsel hired two investigative services to show the ease with which 
Mr. White's current dwelling can be discovered. Defendant's counsel had a skip trace done by 
Diamond Skip Search and a separate search done by a private investigator, Dan Lansing. Id Both 
avenues produced Mr. White's current address in Idaho Falls, Idaho within a few days. Id This 
evidence shows how routine and simple methods could have been used by Ms. Hansen to find Mr. 
White's current dwelling place. 
Months after the six month time period had expired and Mr. White had filed his Motion to 
Dismiss, Ms. Hansen also hired an investigator to locate Mr. White's dwelling. That investigator 
also found Mr. White's current dwelling. Id This investigator was the same person that Ms. 
Hansen hired to serve Mr. White. Had Ms. Hansen instructed this investigator to do a search for 
Mr. White's dwelling during the subject six month time period, the investigator would have been 
able to find Mr. White's dwelling easily. Instead, Ms. Hansen's attorney relied on an office 
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assistant's ability to search on the internet. Therefore, the proof in this matter shows not only the 
relative ease in :finding Mr. White's address, but also the lack of diligent efforts expended by Ms. 
Hansen or those representing her during the relevant six month time period. 
There was a short period of time during the relevant six month time period, when Mr. White 
went to his dwelling in Mesquite, NV for the winter. Mr. White signed a change of address form at 
the post office in order to get his mail while he was temporarily gone. R. p. 156. Therefore, Mr. 
White's temporary address in Nevada could have been obtained through sending a letter return 
receipt requested to Mr. White's Idaho Falls address. 
The above facts show that had Ms. Hansen or her counsel been diligent, Mr. White's current 
address in Idaho Falls would have been easily found along with the address in Nevada. 
Also important to the diligence inquiry is that Ms. Hansen failed to make a timely motion 
for extension of time or a proper motion for service by publication. In the Hincks case, the Idaho 
Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff had failed to take advantage of the options of filing a motion 
to extend time or for publication when the defendant was difficult to locate. Hincks v. Neilson, 137 
Idaho 610,613 (2002). In the present case, Ms. Hansen and her attorney failed to avail themselves 
of the opportunity to file a motion to extend time. Ms. Hansen's attorney assigned a non-lawyer to 
attempt service by publication without filing for an order to serve by publication as required by 
IRCP 4 and I.C. § 5-508. Further, at the point Ms. Hansen's attorney assigned his assistant to 
attempt service by publication, service by publication could not have been accomplished timely. 
IRCP 4( e )(2). Ms. Hansen has not provided any evidence as to why her attorney failed to take 
these remedial actions to serve Mr. White and avoid dismissal. Ms. Hansen and her attorney could 
have solved any problems they were experiencing in :finding Mr. White by availing themselves of 
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the remedies of a motion to extend time or motion to serve by publication. The failure to use these 
remedies highlights the lack of due diligence by Ms. Hansen to effect proper service on Mr. White. 
Based upon the relevant evidence, Ms. Hansen failed to use due diligence in attempting to 
serve Mr. White. The lack of due diligence prevents Ms. Hansen from showing good cause for her 
failure to serve Mr. White. Therefore, this Court should affirm the District Court's dismissal 
without prejudice of Ms. Hansen's Complaint. 
(ii) Factors Outside of Plaintiff's Control did not Prevent Timely Service 
Ms. Hansen has failed to show any circumstances beyond her control that had an effect on 
her ability to timely serve Mr. White. The only circumstance Ms. Hansen has identified that was 
beyond her control was the fact that the Defendant was no longer living at the address identified in 
the police report. 
In the Elliot case, the Idaho Supreme Court was summarizing an earlier ruling in the Martin 
case with a similar issue where the Defendant had moved to Washington during the six month 
period. Elliot v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280,290,271 P.3d 678, 688 (2012). The Court stated, "The 
defendant's relocation to the State of Washington was certainly something beyond the plaintiff's 
control. However, it did not constitute good cause for failing to serve the defendant within the six-
month period required by Rule 4(a)(2) because of the lack of diligence in attempting to serve the 
defendant within that time period." Elliot, 152 Idaho at 290, 271 P .3d at 688; citing: Martin, 133 
Idaho at 3 77, 987 P .2d at 289. The Idaho Supreme Court in Hincks also found lack of diligence on 
Plaintiff's part where the circumstances were quite similar to the present case. 
In Hincks the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident on August 3, 1997. Hincks 
v. Neilson, 137 Idaho 610,611, 51 P.3d 424,425 (2002). The complaint was filed two years later 
on August 3, 1999. The Court notes that when plaintiff attempted to serve the defendants four and 
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a half months into the six month period the process server they hired found out that, "[a]ll three 
defendants had moved from the addresses furnished on the accident report ... " Id The plaintiff 
had the process server attempt to locate the defendants by checking local directories, searching the 
internet and asking neighbors for forwarding addresses. Id at 426, 51 P.3d at 425. The Supreme 
Court held that those actions had not demonstrated due diligence or good cause to excuse the failure 
to timely serve the defendants. Id at 427, 51 P.3d at 426. 
Similarly, in the present case, Ms. Hansen attempts to excuse her lack of proper service on 
the fact that Mr. White had moved from the address listed in the police report. This is the same 
argument that was made in the Hincks case that the Idaho Supreme Court rejected. As in Hincks 
and as shown above, Ms. Hansen failed to use diligent efforts to serve Mr. White. Ms. Hansen 
cannot rely on the address listed on a police report in failing to diligently attempt to serve Mr. 
White. 
(iii) Facts Deemed Irrelevant to Good Cause Determination 
The Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have made several decisions setting forth 
factors that are irrelevant to the inquiry as to whether plaintiffs have good cause for failure to timely 
serve. These factors are worth noting considering some of the facts and arguments made by Ms. 
Hansen in her briefing before the District Court and on appeal. 
(a) Status of Litigant 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that the status of a litigant does not, "excuse parties 
from adhering to procedural rules, even though they may be unaware of such requirements." Elliot 
v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280, 288-289 (2012); citing: Sammis v. Magn,etek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342,346, 
941 P.2d 314,318 (1997). This holding is significant in this matter as Ms. Hansen's counsel 
presented facts that his assistant, Kristen Walker, was unaware of procedural requirements 
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regarding timely service and the procedural remedies of obtaining an order for service by 
publication or for extension of time for service. If pro se litigants are not excused from procedural 
requirements due to inexperience and lack of knowledge, then it should follow that a legal assistant 
working directly under a licensed attorney should not be excused for their lack of knowledge or 
expertise. The Supreme Court has specifically held that an "attorney's inexperience and 
unawareness of the proper procedures did not constitute good cause." Naranjo v. Idaho Dept. of 
Correction, 151 Idaho 916,922 (2011). Therefore, Ms. Hansen, Ms. Walker and Mr. McBride 
should all be held to the same standard of performance and diligence that any competent licensed 
attorney would be held to under the same circumstances. Any facts suggesting lack of knowledge 
or experience as constituting good cause should be disregarded by this Court. 
(b) Effect of Ruling on Ultimate Outcome of Plaintiff's Case 
In Elliot, the Supreme Court quoting another case found that, "the running of the statute of 
limitations and the subsequent time-bar to refiling the action is not a factor to be considered in 
determining whether good cause exists under Rule 4(a)(2)" Elliot at 289; quoting: Sammis at 347, 
941 P .2d at 319. Based upon the above ruling, the impact this Court's ruling will have on the 
outcome of the merits of the case is not relevant to the consideration of good cause. -Even in the 
case where a dismissal of the action will effectively eliminate Ms. Hansen's cause of action, the 
Supreme Court does not allow that fact to be a factor in determining good cause. 
(c) Mr. White's Knowledge and Actions that do not affect Ms. Hansen's Ability 
to Effect Service 
The Idaho Supreme Court in various holdings has consistently found that a defendant's 
knowledge and actions that do not directly effect a plaintiff's ability to effect service are not relevant 
to a good cause inquiry. Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that lack of prejudice to the 
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defendant, the defendant's knowledge of the complaint, settlement negotiations and even 
participation by defendant in a pre-litigation screening panel are not relevant to the question of 
whether good cause exists. Elliot v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280,289 (2012) (Participation in pre-
litigation screening panel was not relevant to good cause inquiry); Campbell v. Reagan, 144 Idaho 
254, 257 (2007) (Defendant's receipt of a mailed copy of process and defendant proceeding as if he 
had been formally served does not create good cause for failure to timely serve defendant); Martin 
v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372,377 (1999) (Settlement negotiations during the six-month time period 
does not excuse or constitute good cause for failure to timely serve defendant). 
Ms. Hansen raised a number of facts that fall within this category of irrelevant information. 
Ms. Walker suggested that she had conversations with Mr. White's insurer, who informed her that 
they had received a copy of the complaint. There was also an argument made that Mr. White knew 
about the complaint because Ms. Hansen had a process server leave a copy of the complaint with his 
son and daughter-in-law. Ms. Hansen has also emphasized an improper attempt to serve by 
publication. Based upon the rulings of the Supreme Court, none of these facts should be 
considered in this Court's review of the totality of the circumstances, because they have been 
determined to be irrelevant. 
Based upon the evidence and past precedents, the District Court's ruling dismissing Ms. 
Hansen's complaint for failure of service should be upheld due to Ms. Hansen's failure to show 
good cause for not serving Mr. White. 
c) The Reporting Statutes Cited by Ms. Hansen do not Change the Requirements 
for Due Process under IRCP 4(d)(l) or Excuse Ms. Hansen's Lack of Due Diligence 
(i) Ms. Hansen has failed to provide any reasoning for this Court to alter the 
requirements or plain meaning of IRCP 4( d)(l) 
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The evidence shows that during the relevant six month period Mr. White's dwelling or usual 
place of abode was 3640 Hickory in Idaho Falls or for a short time at 1402 Sea Pines Street, 
Mesquite, Nevada. Ms. Hansen attempts to argue that certain statutes requiring classes of 
individuals to report their addresses to governmental entities changes the requirements of IRCP 
4( d)(l ). Appellant's Brief at 7-9. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4( d)(l) requires that service be 
had on the individual or left at the individual's "dwelling or usual place of abode". Ms. Hansen 
would attempt to change these requirements by allowing proper service to consist of leaving process 
at an old address that at some past date had been reported as the individual's address to a 
governmental entity. This would change the meaning of the requirements ofIRCP 4(d)(l)(B). 
The Idaho Supreme Court in the case Davidson v. Davidson, 150 Idaho 455,248 P.3d 242 (2011), 
rejected a similar attempt to change the requirements ofIRCP 4( d)(l )(B). 
In Davidson, the plaintiff had attempted service by leaving the summons and complaint at 
the defendant's law office. Davidson, 150 Idaho at 459, 248 P.3d at 246. Plaintiff's argument that 
service was proper was that defendant had at times accepted service at his law office and that 
defendant had used his law office address in court filings. Id The Supreme Court, agreeing with 
the district court, held that defendant's prior actions in accepting service at the law office or his 
putting his law office address on court pleadings did not change the requirements ofIRCP 4(d)(l). 
Davidson, 150 Idaho at 459-460, 248 P.3d at 246-247. 
Similarly, in the present case, Ms. Hansen, without citing any authority for the proposition, 
is attempting to argue that prior addresses given to governmental agencies should be considered 
present dwelling places for potential defendants. Such a finding would radically alter the plain 
language of Rule 4(d)(l)(B). "Statutory interpretation begins with the statute's plain meaning. 
State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999). That language 'is to be given 
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its plain, obvious and rational meaning.' Id." Bright v. Maznik, 162 Idaho 311, 314, 396 P .3d 
1193, 1196 (2017). The plain definition of "dwelling or usual place of abode" is the current place 
where someone resides. Ms. Hansen is attempting to expand the plain language to include all 
addresses previously reported to governmental agencies that had not been corrected upon a person 
moving from that address. Such an interpretation would require completely ignoring the plain 
meaning of the words ofIRCP 4(d)(l)(B). 
Ms. Hansen has not cited any authority for the position that this Court should abandon the 
plain meaning ofIRCP 4(d)(l)(B) or otherwise alter the requirements of that Rule. Appellant's 
brief did include a citation to Ghallagher v. Best Western Cottontree Inn Snake River Petersen 
Properties, LLC, Idaho Supreme Court Docket 43695, 2017 Opinion 1 (See Addendum A). This 
opinion has not been published and a copy was not provided with Appellant's Brief. In reviewing 
the case on the Idaho Supreme Court's website, the facts and holding are not relevant to the present 
matter. In Ghallagher, the Court was examining whether the defendant's failure to file a certificate 
of assumed business name allowed plaintiff to serve defendant an amended complaint past the 
statute oflimitation date and have it relate back to the filing of the original complaint. Id. at 4. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held that the amended complaint did not relate back and that the statute 
of limitation was not ''tolled." Id. at 5. Instead, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that plaintiff 
had a cause of action under LC. 53-509(2), which could still be brought in order to obtain relief for 
defendant's alleged failure to file a certificate of assumed business name. Therefore, the matter 
was remanded to the district court to allow a motion to amend the complaint to include a claim 
under LC. § 53-509(2). Id. at 6. 
Nothing in the Court's opinion in Ghallagher addressed the issues in the present case. The 
subject of the present case is Ms. Hansen's failure to timely serve within the six month period as 
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required by IRCP 4(b ). Ibis case does not involve a statute of limitation, relation back doctrine or 
requirements and penalties for persons filing a certificate of assumed business name. Ms. Hansen's 
attempt to compare the Ghallagher decision to the present case is disingenuous. The futility of 
making a meaningful comparison is shown by Ms. Hansen's failure to accurately quote the text of 
the decision in the Appellant's Brief while attempting to compare it to the present matter. 
Appellant's Brief at 12 and 13. In short, the facts, the law and the analysis in Ghallagher are so 
different from the present case that there is no precedential or persuasive value in attempting to 
compare the two matters. 
Based upon the facts and law, Mr. White's dwelling or abode during the relevant six month 
time period was, 3640 Hickory, Idaho Falls, Idaho, from April 2016 to October 25, 2016, and then 
1402 Sea Pines Street, Mesquite, Nevada. The evidence and law do not support a finding of any 
other dwelling or abode for Mr. White during the relevant six months. 
(ii) The Existence of the Statutes Cited by Ms. Hansen does not Provide Good 
Cause for Her Failure to Serve Mr. White within the Relevant Six Month Period 
Ms. Hansen cites the requirements ofl.C. §§ 49-320; 49-401(B)(5); 49-421; and 18-5413 in 
order to excuse her lack of diligence in attempting to serve Mr. White. The existence of these 
statutes does not provide an excuse for a plaintiff to wait over five months before attempting to 
serve process on a defendant and then afterword, failing to make diligent attempts to serve the 
defendant. 
These statutes also existed at the time of the Hincks case in which the Idaho Supreme Court 
did not find that having a different address on the police report was an excuse for failure of service. 
Hincks v. Neilson, 137 Idaho 610, 611, 51 P.3d 424,425 (2002). 
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It is also very significant that the requirements of the statutes cited by Ms. Hansen would not 
have made a difference in Ms. Hansen's failure to serve Mr. White because (a) Mr. White did not 
violate any of the statutes and (b) if the governmental agencies had Mr. White's current address Ms. 
Hansen would not have known about it due to her failure to search those sources. 
During the time period for service of process in this matter, Defendant was not in violation 
of any of the statutes cited by Ms. Hansen. 
The first statue cited is I.C. § 49-320 which states: 
It is the responsibility of every licensed driver and every person applying for a 
driver's license to keep a current address on file with the department. 
(1) Whenever any person after applying for or receiving a driver's license shall 
move from the address shown in the application or in the driver's license issued, that person 
shall, within thirty (30) days, notify the department in writing of the old and new addresses. 
(2) Whenever any statute or rule requires a driver to receive notice of any official 
action with regard to the person's driver's license or driving privileges taken or proposed by 
a court or the department, notification by first class mail at the address shown on the 
application for a driver's license or at the address shown on the driver's license or at the 
address given by the driver, shall constitute all the legal notice that is required. 
(3) It is an infraction for any person to fail to notify the department of a change of 
address as required by the provisions of subsection (1) of this section. 
Mr. White had stopped driving at the time Ms. Hansen filed her complaint and did not 
renew his license. R. pp. 121-122. Therefore, Mr. White had no obligation under this particular 
statute. 
The next statutes are I.C. §§ 49-401(8)(5) and 49-421. These statutes relate to vehicle 
registration. The evidence shows that Mr. White was not using a vehicle during the relevant time 
period as he was no longer driving for medical reasons. R. pp. 121-22. Further, Ms. Hansen's 
investigator found that the only vehicle currently registered to Mr. White was in possession and 
ownership of his ex-wife. R. p. 146. 
The final statute cited is I.C. § 18-5413 which states that: 
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(1) A person is guilty of a misdemeanor ifhe knowingly gives or causes to be 
given false information to any law enforcement officer, any state or local government 
or personnel, or to any person licensed in this state to practice social work, psychology or 
counseling, concerning the commission of an offense, knowing that the offense did not 
occur or knowing that he has no information relating to the offense or danger. 
Ms. Hansen has provided no evidence that Mr. White violated LC. § 18-5413. Mr. White 
stated that the officer in this investigation asked him for his driver's license. R. pp. 121-122. Mr. 
White did not lmowingly give false information relating to the commission of an offense, but 
willingly handed the police officer the documents requested. The police officer stated that he may 
have just recorded the address information off of the documents provided. R. p. 34. There is no 
evidence that Mr. White knew or realized that the driver's license would cause the officer to record 
the incorrect address. 
Most importantly, the issue regarding Mr. White's compliance with these statutes is 
irrelevant due to the fact that Ms. Hansen did nothing to research the addresses the DMV or other 
governmental agencies had on file for Mr. White during the six month time period. Even if one of 
the governmental agencies had Mr. White's address of3640 Hickory Street listed, neither Ms. 
Hansen nor her representatives would have had that information until months after the six month 
time limit for service had expired. This evidence simply highlights Ms. Hansen's lack of any 
diligence in attempting to serve Mr. White. There is nothing in the cited statutes that relieves a 
party's burden to diligently attempt service in the six months provided. 
Ms. Hansen's argument is advocating for the position that if a defendant has an incorrect 
address on file with the DMV or other agency at any time, then that one fact is good cause for a 
plaintiff to sit back and do little or nothing in attempting to serve defendant during the six months 
provided for service. The plaintiff would be able to show after the six months had expired that 
there was an incorrect address on file somewhere and would automatically be relieved from their 
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obligation to be diligent. The case law cited above shows that the Idaho Supreme Court has 
rejected that approach over and over again. The Court has uniformly held party's with the 
obligation of service to a high standard of diligence. 
The totality of evidence in this matter shows that Ms. Hansen was not diligent in attempting 
to serve Mr. White and that there were no circumstances outside of Ms. Hansen's control that would 
have prevented service of Mr. White had Ms. Hansen acted diligently. 
B) Ms. Hansen Should not be Allowed to Raise Arguments for the First Time on Appeal 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the Supreme Court, "will not consider issues that are 
raised for the first time on appeal." Bell v. Idaho Dept. of Labor, 157 Idaho 744, 749, 339 P.3d 
1148, 1153 (2014) (citing: Sadidv. Idaho State Univ., 151 Idaho 932,941,265 P.3d 1144, 1153 
(2011)). 
Ms. Hansen attempts for the first time on appeal to make an argument regarding equitable 
estoppel. Appellant's Brief at 14-15. Ms. Hansen did not make any argument of equitable 
estoppel in the proceedings in front of the District Court. The record is completely devoid of 
any argument regarding equitable estoppel. Therefore, this claim should be dismissed. 
Even if this Court chose to entertain Ms. Hansen's argument regarding equitable 
estoppel, there is no evidence supporting the elements of equitable estoppel. There is no 
evidence that Mr. White made a false or misleading statement to Ms. Hansen regarding his 
address. Further, there is no evidence that Ms. Hansen relied upon a statement by Mr. Hansen 
regarding his address. Ms. Hansen claims to have relied upon information in the police report, 
which is not a statement of Mr. White. 
Therefore, the record shows that Ms. Hansen's equitable estoppel claim is both improper 
and unsupported by the evidence. 
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C) This Court should Give Deference to the District Court's Findings due to Plaintiff-
Appellant's Failure to Provide the District Court's Reasoned Oral Ruling 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "The party appealing a decision of the district court 
bears the burden of ensuring that this Court is provided a sufficient record for review of the district 
court's decision." La Bella Vita, LLC v. Shuler, 158 Idaho 799, 805, 353 P.3d 420, 426 (2015). 
The Court continued stating, "When a party appealing an issue presents an incomplete record, this 
Court will presume that the absent portion supports the findings of the district court. We will not 
presume error from a silent record or from the lack of a record. Id ( citing: Gibson v. Ada County, 
138 Idaho 787, 790, 69 P.3d 1048, 1051 (2003) (citations and quotations omitted)). 
Ms. Hansen failed to provide a transcript of the hearings in this case wherein the police 
officer, Officer Barker, testified and afterward the District Court issued a reasoned decision from the 
bench. The District Court cited case law and commented on the evidence. The District Court 
adopted his oral rulings by reference in his Order for Dismissal Without Prejudice. R. p. 164. 
Therefore, Ms. Hansen has prevented this Court from being able to examine the decision that she is 
attempting to get this Court to overturn. Ms. Hansen has also prevented this Court from being able 
to read and understand the District Court's comments on the police officer's testimony. 
It should be noted that Mr. White is not commenting on the content of the District Court's 
oral decision or the testimony presented at that hearing. Instead, Mr. White is requesting that this 
Court not presume error from a silent record and view all evidence absent from the record in a light 
most favorable to affirming the District Court's ruling. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the evidence showing that Defendant Gary E. White was not served prior to the 
expiration of the 6 month time limit ofIRCP 4(b)(2) and that Ms. Hansen has failed to prove good 
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cause for failure to timely serve Mr. White, Mr. White requests that this Court affirm the ruling of 
the District Court in this case. 
DATED this {.S ½ay of December 2017. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this/{ hay of December 2017, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to: 
Michael R. McBride 
Signature Law Group, P.L.L.C. 
1495 East 1 rti Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
U.S. Mail ---
___ Hand Delivery 
___ Overnight Mail 
Facsimile ---
---.. ·-----~~- -· .... 
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BEST WESTERN COTTONTREE INN, ) 
SNAKE RIVER PETERSEN PROPERTIES, ) 
LLC, a Wyoming Close Limited Liability, ) 
and DOES 1 through 10 inclusively, ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
Twin Falls, November 2016 Term 
2017 Opinion No. 1 
Filed: January 19, 2017 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Bonneville County. Hon. Alan C. Stephens, District Judge. 
The judgment dismissing the complaint is vacated and the case is remanded for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Browning Law, Idaho Falls, for appellant. Alan Browning argued. 
Moore & Elia, LLP, Boise, for respondent. Steven R. Kraft argued. 
HORTON, Justice. 
This is an appeal from the district court's order granting summary judgment and 
dismissing Geralyn Gallagher's (Gallagher) lawsuit against the Best Western Cottontree Inn (the 
Hotel) and Snake River Peterson Properties LLC (Snake River). The district court held that the 
amended complaint did not relate back to the date of the original filing and that the statute of 
limitations was not tolled by Snake River's failure to file a certificate of assumed business name. 
We vacate and remand. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Gallagher was injured when she fell on a wet floor at the Hotel on July 10, 2012. There is 
only one Best Western Cottontree Inn in Idaho. The Hotel was owned and operated at that time 
by Snake River. In preparing to file this suit, Gallagher searched the Secretary of State's 
database to determine who owned the Hotel. According to the database, the Hotel was owned by 
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L & L Legacy Limited Partnership (L & L) and the certificate of assumed business name was 
current. Snake River acquired the Hotel before Gallagher's injury but failed to file a certificate of 
assumed business name with the Secretary of State's office. 
On July 9, 2014, Gallagher filed this suit. After filing the complaint, Gallagher attempted 
to serve Scott Eskelson, who was authorized to accept service on behalf of L & L. The record 
does not show when Gallagher attempted to serve Eskelson. Mr. Eskelson refused to accept 
service and informed Gallagher that the Hotel had been sold to Snake River and that Snake River 
owned the Hotel at the time Gallagher was injured. Gallagher filed a motion to extend the time 
for service on January 8, 2015. The motion was granted on January 14, 2015. On April 9, 2015, 
an amended complaint and summons was served on Snake River. Gallagher and Snake River 
filed a stipulation to dismiss L & L. On June 4, 2015, L & L was dismissed from the case with 
prejudice. 
Snake River filed a motion for summary judgment in which it argued that it had not been 
timely joined in the case and that the amended complaint should not relate back to the time the 
first complaint was filed. Following a hearing, the district court granted Snake River's motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed the case. Gallagher filed a motion to reconsider, which the 
district court denied. Gallagher timely appealed. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for this Court 
is the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion." Winn v. Campbell, 145 
Idaho 727, 729, 184 P.3d 852, 854 (2008) (citing Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 504, 112 P.3d 
788, 792 (2005)). Summary judgment is proper when, "the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 
56(c). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, 'only a question of law remains, over which 
this Court exercises free review."' Winn, 141 Idaho at 729, 184 P.3d at 854 (quoting Watson, 141 
Idaho at 504, 112 P.3d at 792). 
III. ANALYSIS 
The facts of this case as they relate to the issues on appeal are not in dispute. Neither 
party disputes that Snake River failed to file a certificate of assumed business name with the 
Secretary of State's office. Additionally, it is undisputed that Snake River did not receive notice 
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of this claim until it was served with the amended complaint on April 9, 2015. The only 
questions presented by this appeal are whether the amended complaint relates back to the date of 
the original complaint and whether the statute of limitations should be tolled I due to Snake 
River's failure to file the certificate of assumed business name. These issues will be discussed in 
tum. 
A. Relation back under Idaho Rule of Civil Pn_>cedure 15(c). 
Gallagher contends that the amended complaint should relate back to the date that she 
filed the original complaint. Gallagher argues that because complaints can be amended at any 
time, and because the original complaint was filed within the statute of limitations, the amended 
complaint should relate back to that time. The district court found that because Gallagher was 
amending her complaint to name a new defendant, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) applied. 
Because Snake River did not have notice of the suit within the statute of limitations, the district 
court held that the amended complaint could not relate back. The district court's conclusion was 
correct. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15( c) states, 
[a]n amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted 
relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period 
provided by law for commencing the action against the party, the party to 
be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution 
of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense 
on the merits, and (2) know or should have known that, but for a mistake 
concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been 
brought against that party. 
I.R.C.P. 15(c). This Court has found the phrase, "within the period provided by law for 
commencing the action" to mean within the statute of limitations. Wait v. Leavell Cattle Inc., 136 
Idaho 792, 795, 41 P.3d 220,223 (2001) (citing Hoopes v. Deere & Co., 117 Idaho 386, 389, 
788 P.2d 201, 204 (1990)). In Wait, the plaintiff attempted to amend her complaint to name a 
1 The district court and the parties have used variations of the verb "toll" in their analysis of the effect of Snake 
River's failure to file a certificate of assumed business name with the Secretary of State. This Court has recently 
used the term in this context in Winn and Ketterling v. Burger King Corp., 152 Idaho 555, 272 P.3d 527 (2012). In 
doing so, we have been using a convenient shorthand. 
"[E]stoppel does not eliminate, toll, or extend the statute of limitations." City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 
664, 201 P.3d 629, 637 (2009); Ferro v. Soc'y of Saint Pius X, 143 Idaho 538, 540, 149 P.3d 813, 815 (2006). 
Rather, estoppel "bars a party from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense for a reasonable time after the 
party asserting estoppel discovers or reasonably could have discovered the truth." Id. Our use of various forms of 
"toll" in this opinion refers to whether Snake River is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. 
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new party. Id. at 794, 41 P.3d at 222. The district court found that the amended complaint did not 
relate back to the filing date of the original complaint because, while the defendant had notice of 
the suit within the time allowed for service of process, the plaintiff was unable to show that the 
defendant had notice of the suit before the statute of limitations expired. Id. at 795, 41 P.3d at 
223. 
In this case, it is undisputed that Snake River did not receive notice of the suit until it was 
served with the amended complaint on April 9, 2015. The statute of limitations for personal 
injury claims is 2 years. LC. § 5-219. As Gallagher was injured on July 10, 2012, the statute of 
limitations expired on July 10, 2014. Because Snake River did not receive notice of the suit 
before July 10, 2014, Gallagher failed to meet the requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
15(c) and the amended complaint does not relate back to the date the original complaint was 
filed. 
B. Tolling the Statute of Limitations. 
Gallagher next asserts that the statute of limitations should be tolled because Snake River 
failed to file a certificate of assumed business name with the Secretary of State. The district court 
found that because Gallagher's only search was of the Secretary of State's database, Gallagher 
did not exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the proper party. Because Gallagher did not 
exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the correct party to sue, the district court declined to 
toll the statute of limitations. 
Idaho Code section 53-5042 provides that "[a]ny person who proposes to or intends to 
transact business in Idaho under an assumed business name shall before beginning to transact 
business, file with the secretary of state a certificate of assumed business name in a form 
proscribed by the secretary of state." LC. § 53-504(1). The purpose of the statute "is to ensure 
disclosure on the public record of the true names of persons who transact business in Idaho." LC. 
2 Chapter 5, Title 53 of the Idaho Code was repealed effective July 1, 2015, 2015 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 251, § 3, p. 
1047. Idaho Code section 53-504 was replaced by Idaho Code section 30-21-805. 2015 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 243, § 14, 
p. 784. The new statute imposes similar requirements upon those who operate under assumed business names. The 
newly enacted statute provides: 
(a) Any person who proposes to or intends to transact business in Idaho under an assumed 
business name shall, before beginning to transact business, deliver to the secretary of state for 
filing a certificate of assumed business name in a form prescribed by the secretary of state. 
(b) A separate certificate of assumed business name must be filed for each assumed business name 
a person uses. 
LC.§ 30-21-805. This opinion will address the operation of the provisions of Chapter 5, Title 53, Idaho Code which 
were in effect at the relevant time. 
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§ 53-502. The consequences of failing to file a certificate are provided by Idaho Code section 53-
509. Section 53-509 provides that a business may not maintain a legal action in Idaho until it 
complies with the statute. LC. § 53-509(1). It further provides that "[a]ny person who suffers a 
loss because of another person's noncompliance with the requirements of this chapter shall be 
entitled to recover damages in the amount of the loss, and attorney fees and costs incurred in 
connection with recovery of damages." LC. § 53-509(2). While this Court has previously 
suggested that we would consider tolling that statute of limitations where a party failed to file a 
certificate of assumed business name, we have never been presented facts that would warrant a 
tolling. See Winn v. Campbell, 145 Idaho 727, 184 P .3d 852 (2008); see also Ketterling v. Burger 
King Corp., 152 Idaho 555, 272 P.3d 527 (2012). The facts of this case are readily 
distinguishable from both Winn and Ketterling and would likely qualify under the standard 
announced in those cases, however we find that the statutory remedy is adequate and so decline 
to apply an equitable remedy in this case. By so holding, we depart from our previous indication 
in Winn and Ketterling that we might find circumstances justifying tolling the statute of 
limitations when a defendant has failed to file a certificate of assumed business name. 
As footnote 1 indicates, although the parties and the Court have referred to the remedy 
sought in this case as tolling the statute of limitations, it is more accurate to say that Gallagher 
seeks to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel. It is a fundamental principle that equitable 
remedies are only available when "there is no adequate remedy at law and if sufficient grounds 
to invoke equity, such as mutual mistake, fraud, or impossibility, are present." AED, Inc. v. KDC 
Investments, LLC., 155 Idaho 159, 166, 307 P.3d 176, 183 (2013). In cases where a business fails 
to file a certificate of assumed business name and another party suffers damage, we hold that 
there is an adequate statutory remedy at law. Thus, there is no reason to apply the equitable 
remedy of tolling the statute of limitations. 
Idaho Code section 53-509(2) provides a cause of action for parties who suffer damages 
as a result of a party's failure to file a certificate of assumed business name. In a case where the 
plaintiff has been misled to his or her prejudice resulting in the failure to timely name the proper 
defendant before the expiration of the statute of limitations, the plaintiffs damages will include 
the lost opportunity for recovery in the original action. Thus, in order to recover in a case such as 
this, the plaintiff must show that she would have prevailed in her personal injury action and the 
amount of damages she would have recovered, in addition to any other damages that may have 
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been proximately caused by the defendant's breach of its statutory duty. As this is a statutory 
remedy, a party must bring this action within 3 years of the accrual of the cause of action. LC. § 
5-218. 
Here, although Idaho Code section 53-509(2) was at the heart of the issue before the 
district court, because of our previous statements the parties and the district court understandably 
directed their attention to the question whether the statute of limitations should be tolled without 
consideration of the available legal remedy. Although we find that the district court correctly 
dismissed Gallagher's personal injury action due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, 
we remand this case in order to give the district court the opportunity to entertain a motion to 
amend the complaint to assert a cause of action against Snake River under Idaho Code section 
53-509(2). In view of this result, we find that there is no prevailing party. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We vacate the judgment of the district court dismissing Gallagher's complaint and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Chief Justice J. JONES and Justices EISMANN, BURDICK and W. JONES, CONCUR. 
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